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Abstract: 
This study examines the readability of corporate communication in the CEO letters in the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports presented by the firms included in the S&P 500 
Index. These documents were content analyzed through the use of an automated algorithm 
provided by Readable.IO. Using a frame of analysis based on the social psychology theory of 
impression management, we studied the impression management tactics used. The main 
findings suggest that leading CSR companies (those listed in the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index) present more readable CSR information in terms of comprehension and extension. 
These companies disclose CSR information generally in a positive way. However, these 
disclosure patterns are mediated by the “goal relevance of the impressions” and the “value of 
desired goals” related to the impression management tactics used.  
 
Key words: Corporate social responsibility; Readability; Impression Management. 
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1. Introduction 
CSR implies that a company takes into account the impact of its actions “on 
stakeholders in society, while simultaneously contributing to global sustainability” (Sarkar 
and Searcy, 2016, p. 1433). The communication of a company’s engagement with CSR, that 
is, of its engagement with environmental, social and ethical issues, pertains to topics such as 
climate change mitigation, the relations between management and employees, respect for 
human rights, corporate philanthropy, product liability, and corporate governance 
(Montecchia et al., 2016).  
The communication of such information by companies has been usually done in their 
annual reports, CSR reports or websites (Montecchia et al., 2016). In the wake of Lock and 
Seele (2016), CSR reporting is used in this text as an umbrella term for nonfinancial, 
sustainability, corporate citizenship, or corporate responsibility-labeled reports, albeit 
acknowledging the existing trend toward the use of “sustainability” in CSR report titles. 
Nowadays, given the rapid development of CSR reporting over the last few decades (Shabana 
et al., 2016) and despite the recent uptake of integrated reporting (Zhou et al., 2017), 
corporate financial reporting is used to disclose financial information whilst CSR reporting is 
used to disclose information on non-financial issues, and financial reports and CSR reports 
are usually presented as autonomous standalone reports (Barkemeyer et al., 2014). In this day 
and age, CSR reports are acknowledge as one of the main interfaces used by companies to 
communicate with their internal and external stakeholders (Barkemeyer et al., 2014).  
One common element that financial reports and CSR reports share is the statement of 
the chief executive officer (CEO) (Barkemeyer et al., 2014). It is “a periodic, widely read, 
written, signed, and public representation of a firm’s goals, actions, and results”, that 
constitute “an important element of a CEO’s discursive narration” (Patelli and Pedrini, 2014, 
p. 19) In the case of financial reports, such statement is concededly one of its most widely 
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read parts (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Fanelli and Grasselli, 2005) and its importance is 
well documented (Hooghiemstra, 2010). There is evidence that CSR information is being 
used to an increasing extent to assess management’s quality and the potential for management 
to grow companies’ value (Eccles et al., 2011). It is therefore to be expected that CEO 
statements in CSR reports are also widely read.  
Although there is a burgeoning stream of research on corporate communication 
through chairman/president/CEO statements in annual reports (e.g. Aerts and Yan, 2017; 
Brennan and Conroy, 2013; Clatworthy and Jones, 2001, 2003, 2006; Craig and Amernic, 
2016; Craig and Brennan, 2012; Craig et al., 2013; Fanelli and Grasselli, 2005; Hooghiemstra, 
2010; Hyland, 1998; Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2016; Patelli and Pedrini, 
2014, 2015; Smith and Taffler, 2000), such communication through similar documents in 
CSR reports remains under-researched. As far as the authors are aware only four studies have 
examined CEO letters provided in CSR reports (Barkemeyer et al., 2014; Domenec, 2012; 
Mäkelä and Laine, 2011; Smeuninx et al., 2016).  
Following Barkemeyer et al. (2014), who make an analogy between CEO statements 
in financial reports and similar statements presented in CSR reports, we aim at examining to 
what extent can CSR reports actually serve as accurate and fair representations of CSR-related 
performance. We do this by way of an examination of the readability of the information 
provided in the CEO letters included in the CSR reports presented by the firms included in the 
S&P 500 Index. Our purpose is to compare CSR communication through these documents 
between firms which are deemed as CSR leaders with those that do not enjoy such reputation. 
Using a frame of analysis based on the social psychology theory of impression 
management (IM), we studied the IM tactics used in CEO statements presented in CSR 
reports. Our analysis is grounded on Tata and Prasad’s (2015) conceptual model of CSR 
communication and Leary and Kowalski’s (1990) IM two-component model. This lens of 
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analysis has not been used thus far in the study of CEO letters and CSR reporting 
(Barkemeyer et al., 2014; Domenec, 2012; Makela and Laine, 2011; Smeniux et al., 2016; 
Wang et al., 2017; Abu Bakar and Ameer, 2011). Our argument is that leading CSR 
companies have incentives to be more transparent, because they need to turn CSR image 
perceived by the audiences (current CSR image) consistent with organization’s CSR identity 
(desired CSR image), basically because the “goal relevance of impressions” (assessed by 
public visibility) is a crucial element in the management of CSR relations with audiences.  
The CEO letters in the CSR reports presented by the firms included in the S&P 500 
Index were content analyzed through the use of an automated algorithm provided by 
Readable.IO to extract data regarding IM tactics. To achieve the research goals, we 
partitioned the sample in two groups of firms, those belonging to the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI), arguably world’s best-known CSR index, and those that do not 
belong to this index. Companies belonging to the DJSI are considered as having a higher level 
of CSR performance, and therefore relevant to assess how these companies use CSR 
communication to project the desired images of the organization and their desired socially 
responsible identity to audiences, when compared to their counterparts.  
The main findings suggest that leading CSR companies (those listed in the DJSI) 
present more readable CSR information in terms of comprehension and extension. These 
companies disclose CSR information generally in a positive way. However, these disclosure 
patterns are mediated by the “value of desired goals” related to the IM tactics used.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background. 
Section 3 develops the theoretical framework and presents the hypotheses developed. Section 
4 describes the research design and section 6 analyzes the empirical results. Finally, section 6 
presents the summary and concluding remarks.  
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2. Background 
The study of the readability of accounting narratives has become an important stream 
of research. Readability analysis has been utilized by researchers in numerous settings 
ranging from annual reports (Ertugrul et al., 2017; Hwang and Kim, 2017; Lehavy et al., 
2011; Li, 2008; Lo et al., 2017; Moreno and Casasola, 2016), CSR reports (Nazari et al., 
2017), or integrated reports (Melloni et al., 2017) to the chairman/president/CEO statements 
in annual reports (Clatworthy and Jones, 2001, 2003, 2006), management discussion and 
analysis (Lundholm et al., 2014), CSR disclosure in annual reports (Abu Bakar and Ameer, 
2011), director’s remuneration reports (Hooghiemstra et al., 2017), the compensation 
discussion and analysis section in proxy statements (Laksmana et al., 2012) or earnings press 
releases (Lundholm et al., 2014). Some recent studies have also explored whether disclosure 
readability influences investors’ and judgements in experimental settings (Asay et al., 2017; 
Rennekamp, 2012; Tan et al., 2015).  
The focus of this study is on CEO letters. The importance of such statements in 
financial reports is well documented. As mentioned above, it is a document which is widely 
read by investors (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Courtis, 2004; Fanelli and Grasselli, 2005; 
Mir et al., 2009). Moreover, it is a significant indicator of financial performance (Smith and 
Taffler, 1995), it provides a generic overview of companies’ activities and performance 
enabling investors discriminating between bankrupt and financially healthy companies, and 
therefore subject to strong scrutiny by financial analysts, shareholders, regulators and 
journalists (Smith and Taffler, 2000; Sonnier, 2008), affects investors’ decision-making 
process and firm’s value (Kaplan et al., 1990; Segars and Kohut, 2001), discloses elements of 
a CEO “mindset(s), aspirations, ideologies and strategic thinking” (Armenic and Craig, 2007, 
p. 26), and often personifies the culture and personality of the company (Oliver, 2000).  
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Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2011) discuss four different explanations for discretionary 
narrative disclosures, such as those present in CEO statements. First, the opportunistic IM 
view, which assumes that managers manipulate the information present by way of such 
disclosures to mislead those with an interest in the company, Second, the incremental 
information perspective, which view narrative disclosure as a way though which companies 
provide useful additional information to assist investors with their decision making. Third, the 
hubris approach, that views managers as being affected by a self-deception or egocentric bias 
regarding their performance. Finally, the retrospective sense-making explanation, according 
to which managers provide accounts of companies’ actions and events by retrospectively 
ascribing causes to them. 
We will also investigate the IM view for two main reasons. First, most earlier research 
on IM has focused on the CEO narratives (e.g. Courtis, 1995, 1998; Clatworthy and Jones, 
2001, 2006; Subramanian et al., 1993; Abrahanson and Park, 1994; Thomas, 1997; Yuthas et 
al., 2002; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). Second, and more importantly, in what is probably the 
most systematic study on CEO statements in CSR reports Barkemeyer et al. (2014, p. 242) 
concluded that CSR reporting “has not matured over the period of the study [2001-2010] and 
that the rhetoric used in the CEO statements in sustainability reports is consistent with IM 
rather than accountability of sustainability performance.” 
Literature on corporate communication through CEO statements in CSR reports is 
scarce. To date, few published academic studies examine CEO letters provided in CSR 
reports (Barkemeyer et al., 2014; Domenec, 2012; Mäkelä and Laine, 2011; Smeuninx et al., 
2016), and of these, only Barkemeyer et al. (2014) and Smeuninx et al. (2016) address in a 
more quantitative manner such communication. Domenec (2012) investigates how the CEOs 
of BP, Exxon and Chevron tried to reverse the negative image of the oil industry associated to 
the way in which it harms the environment by using green communication in their annual 
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letters to the stockholders (published in the annual reports) and to the stakeholders (part of the 
CSR reports) for the period 2003-2009. Whereas in letters to the stockholders the focus was 
more on factual information (describing achievements, commitments and projects), in letters 
to stakeholders there was an emphasis on proactive and responsible behaviour and in shared 
responsibility. 
Mäkelä and Laine (2011) compare the use of language in CEO letters from the annual 
and CSR reports of two Finnish companies for the period 2000-2009. They found important 
differences between such statements in the two communication media. Whilst the CEO letters 
provided in the annual reports “make prominent use of the economic discourse of growth and 
profitability”, in similar statements in CSR reports “CEOs rely on the ‘well-being’ discourse, 
claiming that the operations of the company are undertaken in the name of providing well-
being for society at large.” (Mäkelä and Laine, 2011, p. 228) CEO statements in annual 
reports “the seem to follow the dominant social paradigm: business and growth are natural, 
unquestioned and leave everybody better off”, whereas “when discussing sustainability, the 
CEOs use the ‘well-being discourse,’ consisting of explicit concerns for the well-being of 
society, employees and the natural environment, and assure the readers of the company’s 
commitment to sustainability.” (ibid.) 
More relevant to our study are Barkemeyer et al. (2014) and Smeuninx et al. (2016), 
given that they explores in a more quantitative manner the readability of CEO letters in CSR 
reports. Barkemeyer et al. (2014) examined 548 CEO statements in CSR reports and financial 
reports from 34 companies in 3 sectors (automobile, oil & gas, mining) for the period 2001-
2010. They focused on two sentiment metrics [risk mention (certainty) and positivity 
(negativity)] and one readability score (the Flesch Reading Ease). Regarding CEO statements 
in financial reports, Barkemeyer et al.’s (2014) findings revealed a relationship between the 
rhetoric used in the narrative and corporate financial performance. On the contrary, in the case 
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of CEO statements in CSR reports, the narratives do not appear to be accurate reflections of 
CSR performance. Barkemeyer et al. (2014, p. 254) conclude that the findings of their study 
support the view that CSR reports “are increasingly being used for legitimizing purposes”.  
Smeuninx et al. (2016) analysed autonomous CSR reports or chapters from financial 
annual reports or integrated reports with sustainability, CSR, or ESG-related keywords 
present in the heading. They also analysed CEO statements focusing on the company’s 
financial performance in the annual report and CEO letters from CSR reports. Their findings 
suggest that both CSR reports and CEO letters in those reports as less readable than CEO 
letters from financial reports.  
Other relevant studies are Abu Bakar and Ameer (2011) and Wang et al. (2017). Abu 
Bakar and Ameer (2011) examined the readability of CSR communications in the annual 
reports of listed companies in Malaysia. Their findings suggest that companies with good 
financial performance report communicate CSR in an easier to comprehend manner, as well 
as that companies with high (low) performance (in terms of profitability, liquidity and 
growth) present high (low) CSR disclosures readability scores.  
Using a sample of 331 CSR reports issued by US public companies, Wang et al. 
(2017) examined the relationships between CSR reports’ readability and CSR performance. 
These authors hypothesized and found that companies with stronger CSR performance are 
more likely to have CSR reports with higher readability to emphasize positive information. 
On the contrary, according to them, companies with inferior CSR performance are more 
likely to provide more difficult to read CSR reports to minimize readers’ reactions to negative 
information. Their findings also revealed that social performance is more likely to influence 
the readability of CSR reports than environmental performance. 
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We add to this literature by examining the readibility of CEO staments in the CSR 
reports of firms included in the S&P 500 Index and investigating the relationship between 
their CSR perfomance and their CEOs narratives.  
 
3. Theoretical framework and development of hypotheses 
In opposition to financial reporting, CSR reporting appeals to a wider audience (GRI, 
2013), that has been expanding, and it is composed by a greater number of non-expert readers 
(Towsend et al., 2010). More interesting, this wider audience acknowledges CSR reporting as 
a tool of corporate accountability (KPMG, 2013). Organizations have already recognized this 
tendency, and realized that it is not only important to engage in CSR, but that it is also equally 
important to ensure that information about CSR is communicated to audiences (Tata and 
Prasad, 2015). 
These increasing audiences turn CSR reporting susceptible of being used to manage 
organizations’ strategic legitimacy through the use of thoughtfully prepared “legitimation” 
strategies to manage public perceptions about how organizations’ actions are “desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1985, p. 574). Acting in such a way, CSR reporting is used to manage 
the impressions audiences have from organizations’ legitimacy status, reputation, identity or 
“desired” image.  
The rhetoric discourse used in CSR reporting dynamics is crucial to promote relations 
with stakeholders, project a desired image of the organization and its desired socially 
responsible identity, and allowing audiences to make sense of the organization’s actions. CSR 
identity is commonly assessed by substantive socially responsible behaviors, measured on the 
grounds of social performance (Chih et al., 2010). If companies act in an accountable way, 
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they will provide explanations and justifications for their conduct to their audiences, which 
will imply being subject to the scrutiny, judgment and sanctioning of those audiences 
(Schlenker, 1980). Consistent with Frink and Ferris (1998), in an accountability context, 
managers may use CSR reporting rhetoric discourse tactics in an anticipation of an evaluation 
of their conduct, to win rewards and avoid sanctions (Leary and Kowalski, 1990). But, in 
some cases CSR disclosure dynamics – the rhetoric discourse – may diverge from substantive 
socially responsible behaviors (Campbell, 2007). In other words, during the accountability 
process managers can use IM strategies to achieve their strategic legitimacy goals aimed to 
control stakeholder’s perceptions of organizational outcomes and events. Based on IM theory, 
when a incongruence between the perceived image by the audience (current CSR image) and 
the organizations’ CSR identity (desired CSR image) exists, managers have incentives to 
engage in CSR reporting dynamics and turn CSR communication effective to decrease such 
incongruence (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Tata and Prasad, 2015).  
IM has been defined as the “attempt to control images that are projected in real or 
imagined social interactions” (Schlenker, 1980, p. 6). From an economic perspective, IM is 
seen as manager’s rational opportunistic behavior to benefit from them by exploiting 
information asymmetries. This would manifest itself in reporting bias, incorporating either the 
obfuscation of negative organizational (concealment) outcomes and emphasis of positive 
organizational outcomes (enhancement). Consequently, this research approach only allows 
assessing managers’ opportunistic/self-serving behaviors, in the form of “self-presentational 
dissimulation” strategies.  
But, CSR identity is the attributes that collectively represent the characteristics of the 
organization regarding CSR, and therefore can influence emotions, actions, constrains 
decision-making process, and influence the centrality of an organization’s CSR identity and 
the importance of its CSR image (Carter, 2006; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). Moreover, 
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organizations are considered social actors (Whetten and Mackey, 2009). Thus, IM 
assumptions (Goofman, 1959) can be used to analyze how organizations create, maintain, 
defend and often enhance their social identities through settings, props, and scripts in a play 
metaphor (Schlencker, 1980). Consequently, a social psychology perspective of IM theory is 
more insightful to assess the CSR communication strategies used to manage audiences’ 
perception of organizations’ image. Managerial narrative disclosure decisions are affected by 
social constraints arising from the (imagined) presence of the recipients of corporate reports 
who use the information in their decision making (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011) whose behavior 
management try to anticipate (Allport, 1954). In this perspective, managers behavior is seen 
as cognitive and social bias, resulting from manager’s opportunistic behavior (Leary and 
Kowalski, 1990), or from the informational process (Aerts, 2001, 2005). Under a social 
psychology approach, IM can take the form of “self-presentational dissimulation” strategies, 
“enhancement” or “retrospective sensemaking”. Self-presentational dissimulation strategies 
include “creat[ing] an impression at variance with an overall reading of the report” (Stanton et 
al., 2004). Enhancement entails “creating an impression consistent with an overall reading of 
the report” (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). Retrospective sensemaking “is a description of 
chronological actions, facts, and events (retrospective framing) in order that they make sense 
in relation to one another and contextualise organisational outcomes” (Oliveira et al., 2016). 
The present study follows the social psychology perspective of IM theory to 
investigate how managers communicate CSR information to their audiences, and discusses 
the incentives that managers may have to engage in impression management tactics. Our 
analysis is grounded on Tata and Prasad’s (2015) conceptual model of CSR communication 
and Leary and Kowalski’s (1990) IM two-component model, never used hitherto in prior 
research (Barkemeyer et al., 2014; Domenec, 2012; Makela and Laine, 2011; Smeniux et al., 
2016; Wang et al., 2017; Abu Bakar and Ameer, 2011). 
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Tata and Prasad (2015) proposed a conceptual model of CSR communication, in 
which from an impression management theory perspective one way to turn current CSR 
image consistent with desired CSR image is through CSR communication. In their theoretical 
model, to decrease the incongruence between desired and current CSR images organizations 
are motivated to use CSR communication according to four factors: a) importance of CSR 
image to the organization; b) power, status, and attractiveness of the target audience; c) 
importance of CSR image to the target audience; and d) media attention and public scrutiny. 
Moreover, this conceptual model also includes the discussion of other four dimensions that 
constitute the structure of CSR communication: a) anticipatory/reactive; b) 
assertive/protective; c) direct/indirect; and d) image enhancing/image correcting. Finally, the 
model includes a feedback loop through which the targets audiences’ interpretations of the 
CSR communication can influence CSR image incongruence as well as the motivation to 
engage in CSR communication. 
This conceptual model is quite similar to Leary Kowaski’s (1990) two-component 
model IM. This model express that people may engage in IM to increase the likelihood that 
one will obtain the desired outcomes and avoid the undesired outcomes, to enhance one’s 
self-esteem, and to build public images and make their public images consistent with their 
ideal images. The authors advocate that IM involve two processes: impression management 
motivation and impression management construction. Impression management motivation 
takes into consideration the circumstances that determine the adoption of a specific 
impression management strategy which is influenced by three factors: a) the value of desired 
goals; b) the goal-relevance on impression; and c) the existing discrepancy between desired 
and current image. Impression management construction involves “not only choosing the kind 
of impression to create, but deciding precisely how they will go about doing so (such as 
deciding to create the desired impression via self-description, non-verbal behavior, or props)” 
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(Leary and Kowalski, 1990, pp.35-36). Table 1 presents the interconnections between these 
two conceptual models. 
 
(insert table 1 here) 
 
Regarding impression construction process, Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) 
provide an extensive literature and framework building review of the impression management 
literature and identify seven discretionary narrative disclosure tactics carried out by disclosure 
choices and presentation of information (conveying information in a very positive/negative 
way) and selectivity (omission or inclusion of some items of information), such as: readability 
manipulation, rethoric manipulation, thematic manipulation, visual and structural 
manipulation, performance comparisons, choice of earnings numbers, attribution of 
performance.  
The present study focuses on two kinds of impression management tactics (readability 
manipulation, rhetorical manipulation) to investigate how managers communicate CSR 
information to their audiences, and discuss the motivation managers may have to engage in 
those impression management tactics in CEO letters included in CSR reports. 
 
Impression management motivation process: the goal relevance of the impression 
Tata and Prasad (2015) suggest that the centrality of CSR identity and the importance 
of CSR image differ from organization to organization and is similar to a continuum. At one 
end of the continuum organizations are likely to consider CSR as less important, basically 
because they are focus in controlling reporting costs and meeting the minimum disclosure 
requirements. At the other end of the continuum organizations such as those belonging to 
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Dow Jones Sustainability Index are likely to consider CSR dimension as more central, 
relevant and therefore attribute more importance to their CSR image. Leary and Kowalski 
(1990) contend that organizations at this point of the continuum are more prone to engage in 
IM because the impression they make are relevant to the fulfillment of one or more goals such 
as reaping the short and long term associated benefits and avoid undesired outcomes, maintain 
self-esteem, and build public images. However, Courtis (1998, p.459) refer that “effective 
communication on narratives will be improved if those responsible for writing prose passages 
are responsive to the reading and comprehension abilities of their audiences.” Therefore, we 
contend that companies with a stronger CSR public image will be more transparent in CSR 
communication and their narratives will be more readable, with less words and persuasive 
language. 
Hypothesis 1: The number of words and the readability of CEO letters included in 
CSR reports are associated with companies with a stronger CSR public image. 
 
Tata and Prasad (2015) argue that audiences are likely to pay attention to 
organizational activities that they perceive to be important to themselves, and make inferences 
about the organization’s social responsibility based on those activities. Moreover, they state 
that the salience and accessibility of an organization’s CSR image and its perceived 
incongruence is affected by public scrutiny. Similarly, Leary and Kowalski (1990) contend 
that one relevant factor that determine how relevant an impression is to the fulfillment of their 
goals is public visibility. Public visibility is a function of both the probability that one’s 
behavior will be observed by others and the number of others who might learn about it. The 
CSR image of publicly visible companies is relevant to their target audiences who scrutinized 
them very carefully. Thus publicly visible companies have incentives to communicate their 
CSR images in a very transparent way. 
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Hypothesis 2: The number of words and the readability of CEO letters included in 
CSR reports are associated with companies with a stronger public visibility. 
 
Leary and Kowalski (1990) refer that another factor affecting the goal-relevance of 
one’s impression involves the organization’s dependency on the target audience. When an 
organization is dependent on others for valued outcomes, the impressions made on them are 
more important, and organizations will be more motivated to engage in impression 
management. Some of the most relevant stakeholders organizations have is debtholders. The 
more dependent organizations are from debtholders more important their CSR image is to 
them, and more likely they will be publicly scrutinized by them. Consequently, leveraged 
companies are more prone to engage in IM strategies. 
Hypothesis 3: The number of words and the readability of CEO letters included in 
CSR reports are associated with companies with higher levels of leverage. 
 
Impression management motivation process: the value of desired goals 
Leary and Kowalski (1990) contend that there is a positive association between the 
value of the desired goals and the motivation for IM. Consistently, Tata and Prasad (2015) 
refer that as the audience’s power, status and attractiveness increase, influence positively the 
motivation to engage in IM. Stakeholder audience power can be drawn from a variety of 
sources: material or financial resources, symbolic resources or physical resources. Thus, 
according to Leary and Kowalski (1990) target audiences with higher power or status may be 
in a position to provide valued rewards and outcomes, and therefore organizations are likely 
to perceive it as important to manage impressions when interacting with such audiences. 
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On the other hand, Leary and Kowalski (1990) contend that when the availability of 
resources goes down, the value of desired goals increases, and consequently the motivation to 
engage is IM is higher to ingratiate powerful audiences. Leary and Kowalski (1990, p.38) 
argue also that “impression management may be more common in societies with limited 
economic and political opportunities”. In a business context, limited economic and political 
opportunities are associated with lower levels of organizational performance outcomes such 
as profitability. Lower levels of profitability will be more salient to relevant stakeholders and 
expose management to their scrutiny. Therefore, management needs to present more 
accounting explanations to contextualize those lower levels and legitimate themselves before 
stakeholders (Aerts, 2005). If the constructed public impression is consistent with 
management’s self-concept of organizational actions and events, the referred 
contextualization will demand a higher detail, description, and explanation. Therefore, like 
Aerts (2005) and Bloomfield (2008) argue, the level of readability of a narrative may be 
related to an informational process, rather than to the hypothesis of obfuscation of bad news. 
Contextualization of lower levels of organizational outcomes can promote syntactical 
complexity, due to the inclusion of technical explanations containing technical terminology 
and complex syntactical structures. 
Moreover, in the presence of lower levels of organizational outcomes if management 
adopt self-presentational dissimulation behaviors narratives will be easier to read (Newman et 
al., 2003). Narratives will contain fewer cognitive complexities: simpler sentence structure; 
fewer words of causality; fewer words demanding reflection. Such an argument is consistent 
with the idea that “liars tell less complex stories” (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011, p. 322). 
Regarding the rhetoric manipulation it is expected that poor-performing companies 
would be less verbose than well-performing companies. Lower levels of organisational 
outcomes promote self-presentational dissimulation behaviours. Consequently, narratives are 
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shorter, because “lying is associated with fewer details, thus resulting in shorter 
communication” (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011, p. 323). 
Hypothesis 4: The number of words and the readability of CEO letters included in 
CSR reports are associated with companies’ profitability. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1. Sample and data 
Our sample is composed of the firms include in the S&P 500 Index. The CSR reports 
for 2016 were extracted from companies’ websites and we have selected thse companies that 
have a CEO letter in their CSR reports. In view of the purpose of this study, these firms were 
distinguished between those that belong to the DJSI, arguably the world’s best-known CSR 
index, and those that do not belong to it. As mentioned above, companies belonging to this 
index are considered as having a higher level of CSR performance, and is therefore relevant to 
assess how these companies use CSR communication to project the desired images of the 
organization and their desired socially responsible identity to audiences, when compared to 
their counterparts. The final sample comprises a total of 256 companies (Table 2). 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
Table 1 displays the sample distribution by industry. Around half of the sample is 
composed by manufacturing and commercial industries, in all the sample and subsamples. 
Utilities and finance industry represent around 30% of the total companies analyzed. The 
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accounting and market data used to compute the variables included in the empirical study are 
collected from the Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The CEO letters included in the CSR reports presented by the firms included in our 
sample were content analyzed through the use of an automated algorithm provided by 
Readable.IO to extract data regarding the following two impression management tactics: 
readability manipulation (assessed by Flesh reading ease index and Gunning Fog index) and 
rhetorical manipulation (number of words). 
Readability analysis commonly uses syntactical struture of narratives, in terms of 
sentence length and the number of syllables. We used the Flesh Reading Ease index and 
Gunning Fox index to assess readability because according to Li (2008) they are the most 
well-known and reliable indices for measuring the readaility of narrative disclosures. 
The FOG index (Gunning, 1952) identifies how difficult it is for readers to understand 
a text. It considers both total words in a sentence and the percentage of complex words in a 
text. The index indicates the number of years of formal education a reader of average 
intelligence would need to read the text once and understand that piece of writing with its 
word-sentence workload. The higher the FOG index, the more difficult it is for readers to 
understand the text. Similar to the FOG index, the FLESCH Reading Ease index defines the 
level of reading ease of the text. A high FLESCH index represents high text readability. Table 
3 presents the readability formulae. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
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Rhetorical manipulation is commonly used by managers to obfuscate bad news 
through the use of persuasive language to distort the narrative discourse in one or more ethical 
principles, such as clarity, truthfulness, sincerity, and legitimacy (Yuthas et al., 2002). 
Rhetorical manipulation has been assessed by prior research by the number of words (Oliveira 
et al., 2016; Clatworthy and Jones, 2006; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011) and from a psychological 
perspective the number of words can be used not only to obfuscate bad news, but also to 
contextualize organizational outcomes, consistent with a retrospective sensemaking strategy. 
Moreover, the length of a document can be assessed by the number of words used. The length 
of a document has been also used as a proxy for readability (Li, 2008). The economic 
rationale is the following: because the information-processing cost of longer documents is 
presumably to be higher, assuming everything else to be equal, longer documents seem to de 
more deterring and more difficult to read. Thus, the length of a document could be used 
strategically by managers in order to make an annual report less transparent and to hide 
adverse information from investors. 
 
4.2. Estimation model 
To test the research hypotheses we estimated the following regression model to 
examine the motivations managers have to communicate CSR information to their audiences 
in a more readable and transparent way: 
𝐼𝑀𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐽𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑃𝑡𝑜𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
where: 
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IMi is the impression management strategy used and assessed by the level of readability (Fog 
and Flesch indices) and rhetorical manipulation (number of words) (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2017; Li, 2008). 
DJSIi was used to measure the independent variable “CSR image” (Lourenço et al., 2014). It 
is an indicator that assumes 1 if the firm in included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
2015, and 0 otherwise.  
SIZEi was used to measure de independent variable “public visibility” (Branco and Rodrigues, 
2008; Oliveira et al., 2013, 2016) and assessed by the natural logarithm of total assets.  
LEVERAGEi is the ratio of liabilities to total assets (Lundholm et al., 2014).  
PROFITABILITYi was used to measure the independent variable “return on assets” (ROA) 
and assessed by the net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets (Lundholm 
et al., 2014). 
In addition, according to prior literature we controlled results through the use of the 
following variables: 
GROWTHi is the mean of sales growth in the last five years. This variable was included 
because fast-growing firms might have more complicated issues that need to be discussed in 
their narrative disclosures (Li, 2008; Wang et al., 2017; Lundholm et al., 2014). 
PtoBi was measured by the price to book ratio. Firms with higher levels of price to book ratio 
are different from those with lower levels in many aspects, including the investment horizons 
and potential growth. Growth firms may have more complex and uncertain business models, 
and thus disclose more complex information. Consequently, price to book ratio is a potential 
determinant of annual report readability (Li, 2008; Lo et al., 2017; Lundholm et al., 2014). 
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AGEi was measured by the number of years the firm had been in operation since its inception. 
Older firms may exhibit different annual reports readability and length because there is less 
information asymmetry and less information uncertainty for these firms. If investors are more 
familiar with and have more precise information about the business models of older firms, 
then annual reports of older firms should be simpler and more readabale (Li, 2008; Lundholm 
et al., 2014). 
SEGi is the number of segments the firm has and it was used has a proxy for business 
operation complexity. Business complexity has been found to be positively associated with 
the readability (Li, 2008; Richards & Van Staden, 2011; Wang et al., 2017; Lundholm et al., 
2014). 
INDi comprise a set of variables related with SIC codes industry classification to account for 
cross-industry omitted factors affecting the results. 
 
5. Empirical results and discussion 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.  
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
When considering the entire sample, the mean values of the variables FLESH and 
FOG are, respectively, 37.721 and 16.458. The difference found between these two indices 
relates to their definition and scale of measure. A high (low) FOG (FLESCH) index indicates 
a more difficult to read text. The relation between the FOG and reading ease is as follows: 
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FOG 18 means the text is unreadable; 14-18 (difficult); 12-14 (ideal): 10-12 (acceptable); 6-
10 (childish). The relation FLESCH and reading ease is as follows: FLESCH90 means text 
very easy to read; 90-80 (easy to read); 80-70 (fairly easy to read); 70-60 (plain English); 60-
50 (fairly easy to read); 50-30 (difficult to read); 30-0 (very difficult to read). Therefore, these 
results are consistent with each other and both represent that CEO letters included in CSR 
reports are difficult to read. Among CEO letters included in annual reports and in CSR reports 
prior literature have found that the level of readability as very low (Oliveira et al., 2016; 
Barkemeyer et al., 2014; Smeuninx et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2017).  
We also found that the average length measured by number of words the CEO letter 
included in CSR reports is 515.043 words, which is a lower level compared to previous 
studies that have studied the length of CEO letters included in annual reports of UK firms 
(Clatworthy and Jones, 2006; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). 
When comparing the two sub-groups of firms, included and excluded from the DJSI, 
we find that the mean values of the variables FLESH and WORD are higher, and the mean 
value of the variable FOG is lower, in the group of DJSI firms. However, the results for the 
equality of means parametric t test show that these mean values are statistically different only 
for the variables GROWTH and SEG. These results do not support prior literature (e.g. 
Lourenço et al., 2014) that shows that leading CSP firms are significantly larger and have a 
higher profitability than non-leading CSP firms. A potential explanation for this result may be 
related to the fact the present sample only includes firms that provide a CSR report. 
Since the other variables do not present any significant differences between the two 
subsamples, we consider that the two subsamples are similar which avoids any potential 
endogeneity problems. 
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5.2. Correlation matrix 
Table 5 presents the correlations for the continuous variables included in the 
regression models (due to its discrete nature and limited range, we did not include dummy 
variables in the Pearson correlation analysis). There is a high statistically negative correlation 
between the variables FLESH and FOG, which is consistent with their scale of measure and 
with previous conclusions from descriptive analysis. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
It is also worth to note that the dependent variables FLESH and FOG, are significantly 
and positively/negatively correlated with most of the control variables, respectively. Once 
again results are consistent with the definitions and scales of measures of these two indices. 
Moreover, it seems that firms that are larger, older, more profitable and more leveraged are 
more likely to communicate with their audiences in a more readable way. Finally, the 
dependent variable WORD is significantly and negatively correlated with ROA and 
GROWTH. This results is consistent with retrospective sensemaking strategies. Less 
profitable firms are more verbose, because potentially they need to spare more word to 
contextualize and explain the negative organizational outcomes to their audiences (Aerts, 
2001, 2005). 
Regarding the control variables correlations are low, which indicates that 
multicollienarity problems are minimal. 
  
5.3. Regression results 
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Table 4 presents the regression statistics resulting from the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimation of Equation (1) for each of the three dependent variables. The stability of 
the regression model was assured by assessing all the assumptions such as autocorrelation, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, outliers and influential observations, and normality of 
residuals. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
Findings indicate that the regression model is statistically significant for FLESCH (F-
statistic = 4.669; p-value < 0.01), FOG (F-statistic = 2.857; p-value < 0.01), and WORD (F-
statistic = 2.011; p-value < 0.01). The regression model presents an explanatory power of: 
FLESCH (adjusted R2 = 0.158), FOG (adjusted R2 = 0.086), and WORD (adjusted R2 = 
0.049). 
FLESCH score is associated positively (p-value < 0.05) with DJSI. The CEO letters 
included in CSR reports of firms that belong to the DJSI present a higher Flesch Reading Ease 
score. Moreover, FOG index is associated negatively (p-value < 0.1) with DJSI. The CEO 
letters included in CSR reports of firms that belong to the DJSI present a lower level of Fog 
index. Additionally, results also show that WORD is associated positively (p-value < 0.01) 
with DJSI. The CEO letters included in CSR reports of firms that belong to the DJSI present a 
higher number of words. Consequently, H1 (strong CSR image) is supported. This result is 
consistent with our theoretical framework. According to Tata and Prasad (2015) firms that 
belong to the DJSI are more prone to reduce potential incongruences between current and 
desired CSR image through more readable and transparent CSR communication compared to 
Non-DJSI firms. DJSI firms consider their CSR identity important enough to explore both its 
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short and long term benefits, build organizational self-esteem and their CSR public image. 
(Leary and Kowalski, 1990). Since they are aware of their responsibility in making effective 
CSR communication (Courtis, 1998) they interact with their target audiences through the use 
of transparent and readable narratives. In building their CSR public images they also spend 
more words, potentially to better explain organizational outcomes, and imprint credibility to 
the message, highlighting the ethical principles of clarity, truthfulness, sincerity and 
legitimacy (Yuthas et al., 2002). 
Results from table 5 also documents that FLESCH, FOG, and WORD are not 
statistically associated with SIZE. H2 (strong public visibility) is not supported. Consistent 
with Tata and Prasad (2015) public visible companies are more prone to be public scrutinized 
by their relevant audiences. Public visible firms have incentive to engage in IM, basically the 
impression they make will be easily observed by their target audience (Leary and Kowalski, 
1990). Previous results indicate that the dimension of DJSI and Non-DJSI firms did not 
present statistical differences. Prior, literature has used listing status to assess public visibility 
(Oliveira et al., 2016). Thus, there is a possibility that public scrutiny is stronger among DJSI 
firms, rather than among larger firms. 
Findings indicate that FLESCH score is associated positively (p-value < 0.01) with 
LEV. The CEO letters included in CSR reports of leverage firms present a higher Flesch 
Reading Ease score. Moreover, FOG index is associated negatively (p-value < 0.01) with 
LEV. The CEO letters included in CSR reports of leverage firms present a lower level of Fog 
index. Additionally, results also show that WORD is not associated with LEV. Consequently, 
H3 (leverage) is partially supported. According to Tata and Prasad (2015) and Leary and 
Kowalski (1990), the greater a firm is dependent from their relevant audience, more readable 
CSR information firms will use to communicate with them and decrease any incongruence 
between current and desired CSR image. 
 27 
Finally, FLESCH score is associated positively (p-value < 0.1) with ROA. The CEO 
letters included in CSR reports of less profitable firms present a lower Flesch Reading Ease 
score. Moreover, FOG index is associated negatively (p-value < 0.1) with ROA. The CEO 
letters included in CSR reports of less profitable firms present a higher level of Fog index. 
Additionally, results also show that WORD is associated negatively (p-value < 0.01) with 
ROA. The CEO letters included in CSR reports of less profitable firms present a higher 
number of words. Consequently, H4 (profitability) is supported. According to Tata and Prasad 
(2015) and Leary and Kowalski (1990) lower levels of profitability will be more salient to 
relevant audiences and expose them to their scrutiny. But the scarcity of resources promoted 
by lower profits is motivation to engage im IM in the form of self-dissimulation strategies to 
manipulate the perception of the target audience that has power, status and attractiveness 
regarding a variety of valuable resources vital to the organization’s survival. Engaging in such 
strategies, less profitable firms have incentives to conceal bad news and consequently will 
disclose more readable information in shorter messages. Consistent with Merkl-Davies et al. 
(2011, pp.322-323) “liars tell less complex stories (…) with fewer details, thus resulting in 
shorter communication”. However, our results indicate the opposite disclosure behavior. Less 
profitable firms disclose less readable and longer CEO letters. Negative organizational 
outcomes need to be better contextualized, including longer discussions, technical 
explanations with more complex syntactical structures, which is consistent with a IM strategy 
of retrospective sensemaking. 
To better explore our findings, the regression models were rerun after including the 
interaction between the variables DJSI and ROA. Table 6 presents the main findings. The 
models were rerun only for the dependent variables FLESCH and WORD. The model for the 
dependent variable FOG produced the same results. 
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(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
More profitable firms that belong to DJSI disclose more readable CSR information 
than those that do not belong to DJSI. But, less profitable firms that do not belong to DJSI 
disclose less readable CSR information than those firms that belong to DJSI.  
On the other hand, less profitable firms that belong to DJSI disclose more CSR 
information than those that do not belong to DJSI. But, firms that do not belong to DJSI 
(regardless of the profitability) disclose less CSR information than those that belong to DJSI. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The empirical findings indicate that leading CSR companies (those listed in the DJSI) 
present more readable CSR information in terms of comprehension and extension. These 
companies disclose CSR information generally in a positive way. However, these disclosure 
patterns are mediated by the “goal relevance of the impression” and “value of desired goals”. 
More profitable leading CSR companies disclose more readable information in terms of 
comprehension, while less profitable leading CSP companies disclose more readable 
information in terms extension, when compared to the non-leading CSP companies.  
Leading CSP companies have incentives to be more transparent, because they need to 
turn CSR image perceived by the audiences (current CSR image) consistent with 
organization’s CSR identity (desired CSR image), basically because the “goal relevance of 
impressions” (assessed by CSR image and leverage) is a crucial element in the management 
of CSR relations with audiences. 
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However, less profitable leading CSP companies adopt a strategy of quantity of 
information (disclose more CSR information). More profitable leading CSP companies opt to 
disclose CSR information with more quality. 
The present study adds to the emerging literature on organizational impression 
management, basically because it can broaden our understanding on CSR by investigating the 
conditions that motivate an organization to manage, maintain, enhance, and repair its CSR 
image. It can also help mangers and organizations become aware of the various forces that 
could drive the need for CSR communication, and help them be responsive to stakeholder 
audiences by communicating information about the organization’s socially responsible 
strategies and activities. 
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Table 1 – The interconnections between the two-component of IM (Leary and Kowalski, 
1990) and the conceptual model of CSR communication (Tata and Prasad, 2015) 
Two-component model of IM 
(Leary and Kowalski, 1990) 
Conceptual model of CSR communication 
(Tata and Prasad, 2015) 
IM motivation: 
 
- Discrepancy between desired and current image 
 
- Goal-relevance of impressions: 
- Publicity of one’s behavior 
- Individuals’ dependency on the target 
- Value of desired goals: 
- Relevance of target audience 
- Scarce resources 
Organizations are more motivated to decrease the 
incongruence between current and desired CSR 
image (Proposition 1) when: 
- CSR image is very important to the organization 
(Proposition 2) 
- The target audience has greater power, status, 
and attractiveness (Proposition 3) 
- CSR image is very important to the target 
audience (Proposition 4) 
- There are higher levels of media attention and 
public scrutiny (Proposition 5) 
IM construction: 
- Self-concept 
- Desired and undesired identity images 
- Role constraints 
- Target’s values 
- Current or potential social image 
Structure of CSR communication (Propositions 8 
and 9): 
- Anticipatory/reactive 
- Assertive/protective 
- Direct/indirect 
- Image enhancing/image correcting 
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Table 2 - Sample distribution by industry 
Industry DJSI firms  Non-DJSI firms 
 
All firms 
 
 
N % N % N % 
SIC 1 3 3 6 4 9 4 
SIC 2 22 23 34 21 56 22 
SIC 3 23 24 34 21 57 22 
SIC 4 11 11 28 18 39 15 
SIC 5 9 9 17 11 26 10 
SIC 6 14 14 24 15 38 15 
SIC 7 and 8 15 15 16 10 31 12 
All 97 100 159 100 256 100 
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Table 3 – Readability formulae 
Gunning Fog index 0.4 x (average sentence length – percentage of polysyllabic words) 
Flesch Reading Ease score (206.835 – 1.015 x average sentence length) – (84.6 x average syllables per word) 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
All firms (n = 256) 
 
 
   
  FLESH 37.721 37.950 9.136 3.1 67.6 
  FOG 16.458 16.600 1.807 10.1 24.0 
  WORD 515.043 549.500 250.956 97.0 1789.0 
  SIZE 17.063 16.589 1.335 14.506 21.486 
  LEV 0.659 0.656 0.180 0.138 1.133 
  ROA 0.091 0.085 0.084 -0.287 0.434 
  GROWTH 0.044 0.039 0.086 -0.391 0.361 
  PtoB 4.432 3.063 7.924 -69.283 49.095 
  AGE 3.659 3.584 0.685 1.792 5.231 
  SEG 4.484 5.000 2.386 0.0 10.0 
DJSI firms (n = 97) 
 
 
   
  FLESH 38.853 39.000 8.356 18.1 67.6 
  FOG 16.269 16.300 1.593 10.1 19.3 
  WORD 585.773*  509.000 286.064 151.0 1789.0 
  SIZE 17.157 16.840 1.381 14.727 21.486 
  LEV 0.646 0.628 0.175 0.254 1.133 
  ROA 0.086 0.087 0.076 -0.156 0.321 
  GROWTH 0.023* 0.002 0.085 -0.301 0.361 
  PtoB 4.308 2.894 4.907 -5.613 34.518 
  AGE 3.389 3.664 0.755 1.792 5.231 
  SEG 4.794* 5.000 2.259 0.0 9.0 
Non_DJSI firms (n = 159) 
 
 
   
  FLESH 37.031 36.600 9.541 3.1 64.7 
  FOG 16.574 16.600 1.921 11.2 24.0 
  WORD 471.893* 428.000 216.741 97.0 1232.0 
  SIZE 17.006 16.905 1.308 14.506 21.578 
  LEV 0.668 0.676 0.183 0.138 1.285 
  ROA 0.094 0.085 0.088 -0.287 0.434 
  GROWTH 0.057* 0.048 0.085 -0.391 0.334 
  PtoB 4.507 3.260 9.311 -69.283 49.095 
  AGE 3.641 3.555 0.641 1.792 5.003 
  SEG 4.296* 4.000 2.448 0.0 10.0 
* The mean values of these variables are significantly different in the sub-group of DJSI firms, as compared to the sub-group 
of Non-DJSI firms (GROWTH: t-test: 3.107; SEG: t-test: -1.626). 
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Table 5 – Correlation matrix 
  FLESH FOG WORD SENT SIZE LEV ROA PtoB AGE 
 FOG -0.840*** - - - - - - - - 
 WORD 0.161*** -0.149** - - - - - - - 
 SENT 0.272*** -0.317*** 0.943*** - - - - - - 
 SIZE 0.167*** -0.109* 0.067 0.075 - - - - - 
 LEV 0.237*** -0.195*** -0.023 0.019 0.288*** - - - - 
 ROA 0.104* -0.102* -0.132** -0.113* -0.310*** -0.182*** - - - 
 GROWTH -0.017 0.001 -0.104* -0.115* -0.180*** -0.166*** 0.288*** - - 
 PtoB 0.131** -0.091 -0.017 0.008 -0.085 0.089 0.232*** - - 
 AGE 0.168*** -0.161*** -0.011 -0.004 0.089 0.036 -0.039 -0.071 - 
 SEG 0.049 -0.017 0.063 0.075 0.204*** 0.043 -0.079 -0.031 0.059 
Correlation significant at ***0.01 level (2-tailed); **0.05 level (2-tailed); *0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 6 – Regression analysis (all firms) 
  FLESH FOG WORD 
   Intercept 7.810 21.173*** 315.119 
   DJSI 2.218** -0.399* 107.275*** 
   SIZE 0.553 -0.085 19.320 
   LEV 9.306*** -1.879*** -35.699 
   ROA  14.688* -2.708* -471.404** 
   GROWTH 3.387 -1.044 -9.585 
   PtoB 0.110 -0.010 0.172 
   AGE 2.335*** -0.376** -18.276 
   SEG 0.295 -0.19 -1.002 
   SIC 1 -1.711 0.168 -91.678 
   SIC 4 3.075* -0.043 -8.085 
   SIC 5 6.742*** -0.880** -50.335 
   SIC 6 3.746* -0.292 -145.372** 
   SIC 7 e 8 0.232 0.402 -22.894 
   Adj R2 15.8% 8.6% 4.9% 
   F value 4.669*** 2.857*** 2.011** 
   No observations  256 256 256 
Significance levels: ***0.01 (2-tailed); **0.05 (2-tailed); *0.1 (2-tailed) 
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Table 7 – Regression analysis (after controlling results regarding profitability) 
          FLESH 
 
             WORD 
  C1 C2 C3 C4 
   Intercept 11.530 13.585 195.389 356.766 
   DJSI_ROA_H 3.685*** - 65.409 - 
   DJSI_ROA_L 0.641 - 152.454*** - 
   Non_DJSI_ROA_H - -2.071 - -138.124*** 
   Non_DJSI_ROA_L - -2.316* - -79.236** 
   SIZE 0.425 0.441 23.398 21.001 
   LEV 8.722*** 8.689*** -16.700 -25.192 
   GROWTH 5.400 6.100 -7.830 -9.670 
   PtoB 0.121* 0.132* -0.245 -0.351 
   AGE 2.356*** 2.302*** -18.744 -18.061 
   SEG 0.317 0.318 -1.709 -2.377 
   SIC 1 -3.760 -3.820 -25.372 -44.465 
   SIC 4 2.920* 2.810* -2.521 -11.616 
   SIC 5 6.981*** 7.301*** -59.144 -66.526 
   SIC 6 3.666* 3.102 -140.640** -137.785** 
   SIC 7 e 8 -0.177 0.194 -10.961 -29.194 
   Adj R2 15.5% 14.5% 4.2% 3.9% 
   F value 4.591*** 4.330*** 1.869** 1.800** 
   No observations  256 256 256 256 
Significance levels: ***0.01 (2-tailed); **0.05 (2-tailed); *0.1 (2-tailed) 
ROA_H (ROA above median) e ROA_L (ROA below median). Median was determined separately for DJSI firms and 
Non_DJSI firms. However, the use of the global median produces the same results. The use of FOG index produces also the 
same results. 
 
 
